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“You shall treat the alien who resides with you no differently than the
natives among you; have the same love for him as for yourself; for you
were once aliens in the land of Egypt.”
Lev. 19:33-34
“It overworks legal fiction to say that one is free in law when by the
commonest of common sense he is bound.”
Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, (Jackson, J., dissenting).
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution’s guarantee that no person shall be deprived of
liberty without due process of law1 requires that the decision to detain
an individual must comply with minimum standards of fairness.2  This
fundamental right applies to all individuals living within the United
States regardless of their citizenship status.3  Unfortunately, however,
many legal permanent residents4 who have been ordered “removed”
(formerly referred to as “deported”) by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), have been detained without regard for
their constitutional rights to due process and fairness.
Currently, the INS holds approximately 1,800 aliens5 in
“administrative” detention6 without any release or hearing date.7

1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
. . . .”).
2. See Murray’s Lessee v. Holooken Land Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276-77
(1855) (tracing the origins of the principles contained in the Constitution’s
articulation of due process).
3. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (acknowledging that all
aliens within the United States are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); see also
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (“[E]ven aliens whose presence in this
country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process
of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77
(1976) (“Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or
transitory is entitled to . . . constitutional protection.”); Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1896) (holding that aliens within the United States are
protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and may not be punished without a
criminal trial, even ordered deported after completion of their sentences).
4. The term “legal permanent resident” refers to those “having been lawfully
accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant
in accordance with the immigration laws . . . .” Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1994).
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (defining alien as “any person not a citizen or
national of the United States”).
6. Administrative detention refers to detention for reasons other than
punishment for criminal behavior, including: lack of valid documents, ensuring the
alien’s presence at ongoing immigration proceedings, and facilitating removal.  See
Locked Away:  Immigration Detainees in Jails in the United States, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Vol. 10, No. 1, § III, Legal Standards, Sept. 1998 available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/us-immig/Ins989-05.htm [hereinafter referred to as
Human Rights Watch].
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These detainees are not serving a criminal sentence or awaiting trial
on criminal charges.8  Nevertheless, they are held indefinitely, the
majority in local jails, because:  (1) they have been ordered removed,
and therefore the INS will not release them in the United States, and
(2) neither their countries of origin nor any third country will accept
them.9  Most of these detainees have been imprisoned for years
without having been convicted of crimes that warrant such prolonged
detention.10
U.S. circuit courts are divided on the issues of whether Congress
has authorized such indefinite detention and whether such
prolonged detention constitutes a violation of due process rights.11
As a consequence of this divergence of opinions within the federal
judiciary, aliens are afforded different and inconsistent levels of due
process protection, depending primarily upon the jurisdiction within
which they are detained pending deportation.12
Part I of this Comment discusses indefinitely detained aliens within
the context of the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Ma v. Reno.13
Part II discusses statutory interpretation with regard to the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA),14 paying particular attention to those sections that delegate
to the INS the authority to deport and detain aliens.  Part III
addresses the constitutionality of indefinite detention.  Part IV
addresses whether U.S. indefinite detention policies violate
international law.  Part V argues that aliens’ rights must be

7. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, § IV, Findings (“About 1,800 INS
detainees live daily with no guarantee that they will ever be let out of detention”).
8. See id. (noting that “[u]nlike criminal prisoners, INS detainees have no exact
sentence or set date when they can expect to be released from detention.”).
9. See id. (explaining the plight of “long term unremovables”).
10. See id. (finding that many INS detainees have remained incarcerated for years
after they have completed their criminal sentences).  Human Rights Watch
interviewed an Afghani man who had been arrested on a drug charge and sentenced
to seventy-five days in jail.  See id.  After completing his sentence he was handed over
to the INS where he spent another four years in detention and was still incarcerated
at the time of Human Rights Watch’s report.  See id.
11. See infra Parts II.C, III.B & III.C (examining diverging views among circuit
courts).
12. See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 825 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297
(2000) (noting that a statute authorizing indefinite detention raises serious
constitutional questions and furthermore appears inconsistent with prior case law).
But see Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 285 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that
once a resident alien is ordered deported, he no longer possesses any more
constitutional rights than an excludable alien who is owed the least protections in
the face of sovereign interests).
13. 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000).
14. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. II
1996)) (“The Administration’s deterrence strategy includes strengthening the
country’s detention and deportation capability.”).
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represented uniformly, in conformance with both the Constitution
and international law.  To ensure this, Congress must impose
reasonable time limits upon detention, and the Supreme Court must
rule that indefinite detention policies aimed at removable aliens are
unconstitutional.  More than simply unconstitutional, this denial of
due process represents a crisis, albeit within the margins of
constitutional jurisprudence, as it affects those already at the
periphery of American society—aliens.  Nevertheless this deprivation
is antithetical to both the unifying principles underpinning the U.S.
Constitution and the rhetoric inherent in our national psyche—
America as a land of freedom, progress, and the rule of law.
I. KIM HO MA’S STORY
Kim Ho Ma’s journey from his native land of Cambodia began in
1980, when he was just two years old.15  As with most refugees, Ma and
his family left their home due to civil unrest and political
oppression.16  His family reached America in 1985, and in 1987 Ma
became a lawful permanent resident of the United States.17  In 1996,
when Ma was 17, he was convicted of first-degree manslaughter as the
result of his involvement in a gang-related shooting.18  Ma was tried as
an adult and sentenced to 38 months in prison, but was released early
for good behavior.19  This was Ma’s only criminal conviction.20  Upon
his release from prison, the INS placed Ma into custody and, based
upon his conviction as an aggravated felon, instituted deportation
proceedings against him.21
Despite the fact that Ma had lived the majority of his life as a U.S.

15. See Ma, 208 F.3d at 819.
16. See id. (noting that Ma’s family fled Cambodia in 1979 and subsequently
spent five years in refugee camps).  “Refugee” has been defined as a person who has
fled his or her home country because of a well-founded fear of persecution due to
their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social
group.  See U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. I,
189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954); see also U.N. Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31 1967, art. I, U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606
U.N.T.S. 267.
17. See Ma, 208 F.3d at 819.
18. See id.
19. See id. (noting that Ma was sentenced to thirty-eight months in prison but was
released after twenty-six months).
20. See id.
21. See id. (stating that Ma was found to be both removable as well as ineligible
for “withholding of deportation because of his conviction”); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996) (listing other crimes for which the INS is authorized to
remove aliens, including crimes of moral turpitude, multiple criminal convictions,
high speed flight, crimes involving controlled substances, certain firearms offenses,
crimes of domestic violence, stalking and child abuse and other miscellaneous crimes
involving espionage, sabotage and treason).
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resident alien, IIRIRA allowed the INS to remove Ma and send him
back to Cambodia.22  Cambodia, however, does not have a
repatriation agreement with the United States, and therefore refused
to allow Ma to return.23  Thus, the INS held Ma in prison for more
than two years after his lawful prison sentence had expired; claiming
the power to detain him indefinitely under the guise of IIRIRA.24  In
April 2000, however, the Ninth Circuit ordered Ma’s release,25 finding
that the INS lacks authority under existing immigration laws to
indefinitely detain those aliens who have entered the United States,
yet who cannot be removed to their native lands.26
In deciding this case, the Ninth Circuit carefully applied the canon
of constitutional avoidance27 so as to avoid deciding the Ma case on
due process grounds.28  Other circuit courts when faced with similar
cases have reached contradictory results.29  These courts have held
that the INS’ indefinite detention policy is not unconstitutional, and
furthermore that decisions concerning the length of detention
should be left ultimately to the discretion of the Attorney General30

22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1237(a)(2)(iii) (Supp. II 1996) (“Any alien who is convicted of
an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”).
23. See Ma, 208 F.3d at 819 (explaining that the United States and Cambodia still
have yet to reach a repatriation agreement).  Other countries with whom the United
States has no diplomatic relations, or who simply refuse to admit their citizens who
have fled include: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Laos, Libya, and Vietnam.  See HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 6, § IV, Findings.
24. See Ma, 208 F.3d at 819 (explaining that although Ma filed two motions for
release on bond in 1997, the court denied both requests determining, based upon
his one criminal conviction, that Ma posed a danger to the community).
25. See id. at 831 (“Under these circumstances, the INS may not detain Ma any
longer.”).
26. See id. at 822 (construing the detention provisions of IIRIRA as giving the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) authority to detain aliens only for a
reasonable time beyond the statutory removal period).
27. See id. (noting a long-standing rule that courts should interpret statutes in
such a way that will allow them to avoid deciding significant constitutional questions)
(citing DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg., 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) and United
States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916)).  This rule often has been used in
the immigration context.  See, e.g., United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199
(1957) (holding that a statute requiring aliens to answer truthfully all INS questions
implicitly refers to all questions relevant to immigration status).  The Court in
Witkovich read this limitation into the statute in order to avoid the constitutional
questions that would arise if the statute was interpreted as requiring aliens to answer
all questions posed to them, whether or not they were relevant to INS’ purpose of
regulating immigration. See id. at 199.
28. See Ma, 208 F.3d at 827 (noting that the INS’ extension of exclusion law to
aliens already within the United States raises significant constitutional questions and
“we may avoid [answering those questions] by giving the statute a construction that
does not require us to undertake any constitutional inquiry”).
29. See infra note 31.
30. The Attorney General is responsible for administering and enforcing all laws
relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)
(1999). She has the authority to delegate decision-making power to the
Commissioner of the INS, who in turn may delegate power to any other officer or
COXJCI.DOC 7/10/2001  12:16 PM
730 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:725
and the INS rather than to the courts.31
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA)
In 1996, Congress passed the IIRIRA, which radically altered the
landscape of U.S. immigration law.32  Pursuant to IIRIRA, these
sweeping changes included mandatory detention for certain
categories of immigrants and an expansion in the number of crimes
for which aliens could be divested of their legal status and be
deported.33  Many of the individuals affected by this law are legal
permanent residents who, prior to serving their criminal sentences,
lived, worked, and paid taxes in the United States.34  In addition,
many of these individuals have children who are U.S. citizens by birth
right.35

employee of the INS. See id.
31. See Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1057 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding the language
of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (Supp. II 1996) to mean unambiguously that the absence of
an express time limit on the Attorney General’s authority to continue to detain
beyond ninety days infers that Congress authorized the Attorney General to
indefinitely detain certain removable aliens); see also Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185
F.3d 279, 297 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that as long as INS continues to make good
faith efforts to deport the resident alien, it can continue to detain him if he is either
a danger to the community or poses a flight risk).
32. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp.
II 1996)).  IIRIRA made significant changes to the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) which had previously governed most matters dealing with immigration and
aliens. See generally Donald Kerwin, Detention of Newcomers:  Constitutional Standards and
New Legislation:  Part One, 96-11 Immigr. Briefings 1 (1996) (considering detention
issues in depth, placing special emphasis on changes brought about by IIRIRA).
33. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, § II, Introduction (explaining that
before the passage of IIRIRA in 1996, murder, rape, and other serious felonies were
the only crimes that could result in deportation).  Since the enactment of IIRIRA,
any conviction carrying a sentence of one year or longer, as well as some minor drug
offenses and shoplifting, requires deportation, whether or not the sentence has been
suspended or actually served. See id. (citing Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
§§ 212(a), 237(a) and 238(a)); see also Sean D. Murphy, Non-State Entities in
International Law, Immigration To and Removal From the United States, 94 AM. J. INT’L L.
102, 111 (Jan. 2000) (noting that while Congress added considerably to the list of
offenses that could result in an alien’s removal, it also made it much more difficult to
obtain relief from such removal).  Congress’ new regulations created a situation
whereby immigration judges were compelled to deport some aliens, who might
otherwise present sympathetic cases, such as those who were fully rehabilitated from
their prior criminal acts.  See id. at 112-13.  Murphy also notes that during Fiscal Year
1999, 62,359 aliens were removed as a result of criminal records, including drug
convictions (forty-seven percent), criminal violations of immigration law (thirteen
percent), and convictions for burglary (five percent) and assault (six percent). See id.
at 113.
34. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, § II, Introduction.
35. See id.
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Essentially, under IIRIRA, if an alien has been convicted of an
aggravated felony, upon completion of his prison sentence, he36 may
again be placed into custody by the INS, through an order of the
Attorney General.37  The Attorney General then will determine
whether he should be released into society or removed from the
United States.38  Once ordered removed however, it is not always
possible to return the alien to his country of birth.39
Most indefinitely detained individuals are citizens of countries with
which the United States has little or no diplomatic relations or that
simply refuse to accept the return of citizens who have emigrated or
fled.40  Other detainees are held indefinitely, because they are
“stateless,” in that no legal state recognizes the alien’s nationality.41
Still other detainees are held indefinitely, because political upheaval
or war has destroyed their home nation’s infrastructure, thus
eliminating any functioning government.42  Consequently, often there

36. For ease of reading, this Comment will use a masculine pronoun in referring
to aliens; however, both men and women are affected by this policy.
37. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996) (“During the removal period, the
Attorney General shall detain the alien.”).
38. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(iii) (stating that an alien who “is convicted of an
aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable”).
39. See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 297
(2000) (finding that the Cambodian government would not accept the return of its
nationals from the United States due to a lack of a repatriation agreement between
the two nations).  In designating which country a removable alien should be sent,
there are several options the Attorney General may consider.  See generally 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b) (2000).  Removable aliens can designate the country to which they would
like to be removed.  See id. § 1231(b)(2)(A)(i).  The Attorney General must honor
the alien’s request, unless the designated country refuses to accept the alien or does
not respond to the request within thirty days.  See id. § 1231(b)(2)(C)(ii-iii).  If the
INS is unable to remove the alien to his country of choice, it will attempt to remove
him to his country of birth or citizenship. See id. § 1231(b)(2)(D).  If removal to the
alien’s country of citizenship is not possible, the INS will attempt to remove him to
any other country that will accept him. See id. § 1231(b)(2)(E).  For additional
demographic information on the indefinitely confined, see Donald Kerwin, Throwing
Away the Key:  Lifers in INS Custody, 75 Interpreter Releases 649, 650 (1998)
(discussing the demographics of the indefinitely confined and analyzing statutory
and constitutional standards that protect aliens who are administratively detained).
40. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, § IV, Findings (noting that Vietnam,
Laos, Cambodia, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Libya are among the countries that often
refuse to accept the return of their citizens).
41. See id. (such “stateless” people may include Palestinians, those born in
refugee camps, or citizens of governments that no longer exist).  International law
defines a stateless person as one “who is not considered as a national by any state
under the operation of its law.”  See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, art. 1, 360 U.N.T.S. 117, 136.  See generally UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSION ON REFUGEES (UNHCR), STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES, ch. 6
(Oxford 1997); C. Batchelor, Stateless Persons:  Some Gaps in International Protection, 7
INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 232 (1995) (positing that statelessness is an increasing
problem of international law and identifying some of the major gaps in the legal
protections of stateless persons).
42. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, § IV, Findings.
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is literally no place to remove these so-called “removable” aliens.
Many of these “non-removable” removable aliens are held in
detention for extended periods of time without knowing when, if
ever, they will be released.43  According to IIRIRA, if the INS orders
an alien removed, the Attorney General has ninety days in which to
deport him.44  The statute also states, however, that an alien ordered
removed may be detained beyond the ninety day removal period, but
does not specify a maximum length of detention.45
B. The Plenary Power Doctrine and Judicial Deference
In analyzing immigration matters and interpreting legislation such
as IIRIRA, it is a long-standing common law principle that the
judiciary should defer to the legislative and executive branches of
government.46  This principle of full federal authority and judicial
deference is generally known as the “plenary power doctrine.”47
Essentially, the doctrine stems from the need for political branches of
government to conduct the nation’s foreign affairs.48

43. See, e.g., Kerwin, supra note 39, at 651 n.10 (noting that Louisiana’s Oakdale
facility alone houses aliens from 36 different countries, who have been held in INS
administrative detention for over one year).
44. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2000) (“[E]xcept as otherwise provided . . .
when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from
the United States within a period of 90 days.”).
45. See id. § 1231(a)(6) (stating that an alien ordered removed under section
1227(a)(2) “may be detained beyond the removal period”).  Aliens may be detained
beyond the removal period if for example the Attorney General has determined they
are a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal.  See id.
46. The two leading Supreme Court decisions on this issue, United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950) and Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953), hold that with respect to immigration matters, the
judiciary should defer to the executive as long as the executive is acting within the
boundaries set by Congress.
47. See generally Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens:
Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 939
(1995) (providing that the plenary power doctrine is rooted in three related
principles: (1) immigration policy is the responsibility of the federal government;
(2) the primary federal immigration authorities are the legislative and executive
branches; and (3) the judiciary has extremely limited, if any, power to review the
immigration decisions of the other branches).
48. See Weisselberg, supra note 47, at 938 (noting that courts have generally
viewed the federal government’s immigration authority as an inseparable part of
their foreign affairs power); see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,
606 (1889) (advancing the notion that, because a nation’s most important function is
to maintain security against foreign aggression and to preserve independence, all
other concerns must remain subordinate).  The Ping court emphasized, in this case,
which became known as the “Chinese Exclusion Case,” that “[i]t does not matter in
what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign
nation acting in its national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in
upon us.” See id.  See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (arguing
that because the power to exclude aliens is fundamental to a nation’s sovereignty
(i.e. the necessity of maintaining normal international relations and defending the
country against foreign aggression), it should be exercised exclusively by the political
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Courts have justified invoking the plenary power doctrine, and
deferred to the legislative and executive branches, in cases where
they perceive the national security to be an issue49 or where they
feared that a hostile foreign government was attempting to compel
the United States to accept its “undesirable” citizens.50  These policy
concerns, however, are unique and applicable only to a small subset
of constitutional immigration cases involving aliens that the U.S.
government wished to exclude from admission.51  This distinct group
of aliens is otherwise referred to as “excludable” aliens.52

branches of government).  But see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952)
(explaining that while the power to regulate immigration belongs to the legislative
and executive branches of government, the Constitution dictates that this power
remain subject to judicial intervention).  See also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-
35 (1982) (finding that the role of the judiciary is to determine whether an alien’s
minimum constitutional due process rights have been infringed upon); Fiallo v. Bell,
430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977) (assessing the Court’s immigration case law as reflecting
an acceptance of a “limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution” with
regard to Congress’ power to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens); Flores
v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that an essential aspect of
the right to personal liberty is the “ability to test the legality of any direct restraint
that the government seeks to place on that liberty”).
49. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 547
(1950).  Knauff was a German citizen who sought admission to the United States in
1948.  Id. at 539.  Though she had recently married an American army veteran of
World War II, the Court upheld her exclusion from the United States based on
unsubstantiated allegations that she was a spy and thus a threat to national security.
Id. at 547.  The court found Knauff’s exclusion without a hearing was permissible
because “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far
as an alien denied entry is concerned.” Id. at 544 (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651, 660, 664 (1892) (upholding the exclusion of an alien without a
hearing on the basis that she was likely to become a public charge)).
50. See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1995)
(speculating that judicial decisions requiring excludable aliens to be released into
American society, when neither their own country nor any other will admit them,
could encourage the same sort of problems the United States experienced with Cuba
during negotiations over the Mariel boatlift refugees); see also Jean v. Nelson, 727
F.2d 957, 975 (11th Cir. 1984) (expressing the fear that judicial intervention in
immigration matters, i.e. securing the release of otherwise excludable aliens, would
create the intolerable circumstance in which other nations could purposefully send
nationals over to the United States, then refuse to take them back, in effect
compelling the United States to grant these aliens physical admission, and thus
undermining the integrity of United States borders).
51. See, e.g., Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 664 (holding that a Japanese immigrant could be
excluded if it was found that he was likely to become a “public charge” under the
law); see also United States ex rel. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 547 (denying entry to an alien
suspected of having spied while working as a civilian for the United States Army in
Germany).
52. In immigration law, there was a historical and significant distinction between
aliens who have already entered the United States and those who stand at the border
or elsewhere seeking to gain admission (otherwise known as excludable aliens).  This
distinction was acknowledged in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
212 (1953), where the Court stated that once an alien has “passed through our gates,
even illegally, [he] may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.” Id.  The Court reiterated
this distinction between physically present aliens and those seeking admission in
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Once an alien has been admitted as a lawful permanent resident
however, the government’s foreign policy and national sovereignty
concerns are much less compelling.53  Issues concerning these aliens,
such as indefinite detention policies aimed at protecting the
community, are more domestic than international in nature and
represent congressional interest in maintaining a safe society.54
Because cases involving lawfully admitted aliens do not generally
invoke international or foreign policy concerns, the need for
adherence to the plenary power doctrine and judicial deference in

Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982), when it held that “once an alien gains
admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent
residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.”  See also Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (acknowledging that the detention of aliens in deportation [as
opposed to exclusion] proceedings must be measured by the Due Process Clause).
See generally Weisselberg, supra note 47, at 937 (explaining that the distinction
between excludable and removable aliens is related to the idea that people who have
been living in the United States are likely to have established strong ties to the
country).  Historically, when the INS attempted to deport aliens who had established
ties to the United States, courts acknowledged that these aliens were entitled to a
different process than those aliens seeking entry from outside the border.  See id.
Consequently, excludable aliens are not afforded the same constitutional due
process protections as those aliens who are physically present within the United
States.  See id.  As the Ma Court observed, “[n]on-citizens who are outside United
States territories enjoy very limited protections under the United States
Constitution . . . .  [In fact,] it is not settled that excludable aliens have any
constitutional rights at all.”  See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 824 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 297 (2000).
It is interesting to note that in 1996, the Immigration and Nationality Act’s
definition of aliens deemed “admitted” to the United States was dramatically
amended.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (1999).  An alien is no longer deemed
“admitted” under the INA unless he entered the country lawfully.  “The terms
‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to the lawful entry of the alien to the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”  See
Illegal Immigration Reform And Immigration Responsibility Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
104-208, Sec. 301(a), 110 Stat. 3009-575 (1996).  Therefore, aliens who enter the
United States unlawfully are not physically present under the statute and will not be
afforded the same limited constitutional protections as those aliens deemed
admitted and physically present.
53. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215 (indicating that permanent resident aliens,
temporarily detained pending removal proceedings, may be released on bond at the
discretion of the Attorney General, whose decision is subject to judicial review).  The
Mezei Court compared the detention of aliens in removal proceedings to the
detention of excludable aliens and noted that aliens seeking admission to the United
States are generally excluded on the basis of foreign policy or national security
concerns, and “neither the rational nor the statutory authority for [their] release
exists.” Id. at 216.  See also Fernandez-Santander v. Thornburgh, 751 F. Supp. 1007,
1009 (D. Me. 1990) (holding that judicial deference to the plenary power of
Congress is applicable to Congress’ decisions about who is excludable, but not to its
decisions regarding treatment of aliens during the deportation process).
54. See Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1062 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000) (Brorby, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the reason for detaining aliens, including prevention of
flight and protecting the community, are domestic concerns having nothing to do
with foreign policy) (citing Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 (W.D. Wash.
1999) (holding that the plenary power doctrine has less force over domestic issues
than foreign policy matters)).
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deciding these cases is significantly diminished.55
In addition, the notion of absolute sovereignty has declined with
the increasing influence of international norms and human rights
standards.56  International human rights treaties57 require nation-
states to relinquish some measure of sovereignty over foreign
individuals within their borders.58  This relinquishment, in turn, has
led to a weakening of the plenary power.59  Consequently, the notion
that every sovereign and independent nation has the inherent and
inalienable right “to exclude or to expel . . . any class of aliens
absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace”60 is no
longer necessarily true.
Therefore, because residents of the United States clearly have
liberty interests protected by both the Constitution61 and
international law,62 judicial review of matters such as deportation and
detention are not necessarily precluded by the plenary power

55. See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1903) (acknowledging the
plenary power of the political branches of government with respect to an alien’s right
to enter the country but rejecting the government’s assertion of identical plenary
powers with respect to resident aliens).
56. See Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV.
965, 965 (1993) (exploring the plenary power doctrine against the backdrop of
internationally changing norms and concluding that the plenary power doctrine has
been undermined).
57. See, e.g., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).  The Universal Declaration is a
non-binding, aspirational statement that proclaimed “a common standard of
achievement for all nations and all peoples” with respect to life, liberty, property, and
equal protection.  Id. at Preamble.  The United Nations General Assembly approved
the Universal Declaration by a vote of 48-0.  Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia abstained. See
Scaperlanda, supra note 56, at 1010 n.228.
58. See Scaperlanda, supra note 56, at 1011 (discussing how the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights evidences the agreement by a diverse global
community that certain basic rights must be recognized by all).  Scaperlanda notes
that the Declaration stands for the proposition that while the international
community recognizes the sovereignty of independent states, this sovereignty is
limited by international human rights principles.  See id.
59. See id. at 1009-11 (discussing the “rights revolution” as a basis for the
weakening of the plenary power doctrine).
60. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 231 (1896).
61. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (holding that petitioner
was protected by the Due Process Clause because of her status as a resident alien); see
also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993) (finding due process requires that
minimum standards be met when the government holds juvenile aliens in custody
pending deportation).
62. See The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 717 (stating in its preamble, the “foundation of freedom, justice and peace
in the world is “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family”).  The Covenant goes on to require that
each contracting state “ensure[s] to all individuals within its territory . . . the rights
recognized in the present covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
color, sex, language, religion, political, or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.” See id.
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doctrine.63  Furthermore, although Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council64 and its progeny hold that the judiciary must generally
defer to the Executive department’s construction of a statutory
scheme, it is not controlling in all instances.65  Rather, when an
agency’s interpretation of a particular statute raises a substantial
constitutional question, traditional Chevron principles of deference
do not apply.66  In such instances, it is the role of the judiciary to

63. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1903) (narrowly construing the
government’s exercise of plenary power over resident aliens).
64. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that where a statute is silent or
ambiguous, the appropriate agency’s interpretation should be granted deference as
long as it is based on a permissible construction of the statute).
65. See id. at 865-66 (explaining that, in situations where Congress inadvertently
or intentionally did not resolve a situation involving competing policy interests, it is
most appropriate to allow the agency charged with the administration of a specific
statute to make the relevant policy choices); see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S.
415, 424-25 (1999) (incorporating Chevron principles and finding judicial deference
appropriate to the Bureau of Immigration Appeal’s interpretation of “withholding of
deportation” under the Immigration and Nationality Act).  See generally Sanford N.
Greenberg, Who Says It’s A Crime?:  Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Regulatory Statutes that Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1996).
Greenberg analyzes the Court’s two-step process for determining how statutes, which
have been assigned to specific administrative agencies for implementation, should be
interpreted.  See id. at 7.  Step (1) requires the court to determine whether or not the
“precise question at issue” has been addressed by Congress. See id. at 8.  If so,
administrators as well as the courts must “give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.”  See id.  In step (2), if the court decides that the statute is
ambiguous, then the court must defer to “permissible” or “reasonable”
interpretations offered by the relevant agency assigned by Congress to administer the
statute. See id. at 8-9.  The Chevron Court advocated for judicial deference to the
specialized expertise of administrators, believing that, in general, agencies are likely
to know more about the issue being regulated and are more accountable to the
public for decisions they make.  See id. at 9.  But see Deborah E. Anker, Discretionary
Asylum; A Protection Remedy for Refugees Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 1,
50 n.230 (1987) (arguing that Chevron’s power is limited, and recently has been
restricted to circumstances where specific legal standards are applied to particular
facts).  See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445, nn.29-30 (1987)
(declining the INS’ request for heightened deference as to the agency’s
interpretation of the Refugee Act of 1980); International Union, UAW v. Brock, 816
F.2d 761, 765 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reasoning that Chevron and Cardoza-Fonseca
indicate that the interpretation of statutes is a question of statutory construction for
courts to decide and declining to defer to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of
the Trade Act and the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act of 1972).
66. See, e.g., Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 1997)  (holding that
the Interior Board of Indian Appeals’ (IBIA) construction of the Reindeer Industry
Act raised grave constitutional questions under the Equal Protection Clause, and
therefore declining to grant judicial deference to the IBIA’s interpretation); see also
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (finding that
the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) interpretation of the National Labor
Relations Act raised serious First Amendment questions, and refusing to defer to the
NLRB); Chamber of Commerce v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 69 F.3d 600, 605 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (holding that a Federal Election Commission rule raised troubling
constitutional questions and declining the agency’s interpretation judicial
deference).  See generally J. Clark Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Statutory Interpretation:
Four Theories in Disarray, 53 SMU L. REV. 81 (2000) (providing an analysis of the
opinions of the Supreme Court for the 1998 term and classifying each opinion
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interpret the statute’s meaning.67
C. Interpreting IIRIRA:  A Divergence of Opinions
1. The Ninth Circuit
The IIRIRA plainly states, if “an alien . . . has been determined by
the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or [is] unlikely to
comply with the order of removal, [that alien] may be detained
beyond the [ninety-day] removal period.”68  Herein lies the problem:
due to the absence of a maximum time frame beyond the 90-day
removal period, the INS has argued that it has the authority to detain
such aliens indefinitely.69  In deciding Ma, however, the Ninth Circuit
found this interpretation to be incorrect; holding that INS officials
could not continue to jail aliens after the ninety-day removal period if
deportation could not be effected within the “reasonably foreseeable
future.”70
The Ma court acknowledged that the Attorney General’s
interpretation of immigration laws ought to be afforded substantial
deference.71  The court, however, noted that Ma’s status as a resident
alien entitles him to certain constitutional protections.72

involving statutory interpretation by the theory of interpretation underpinning it);
William Funk, Supreme Court News, Supreme Court Addresses Chevron in Several Cases,
24 SUM ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4 (1999); Greenberg, supra note 65, at 1 (discussing
proposed exceptions to Chevron deference with regard to criminal liability and
deportation statutes).  Because both criminal sanctions and deportation of aliens
involve very harsh results, it has been argued that courts should construe these types
of administrative statutes narrowly to avoid overreaching by prosecutors and
immigration officials, which could result in decisions that are not clearly authorized
by Congress. See id.
67. See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 821 n.13 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Williams v.
Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 662 (9th Cir. 1997) (“When agencies adopt a constitutionally
troubling interpretation . . . we can be confident that they not only lacked the
expertise to evaluate the constitutional problems, but probably didn’t consider them
at all.”); Gilbert v. NTSB, 80 F.3d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that because
agencies have neither the power nor the jurisdiction to resolve challenges to the
constitutionality of statutes promulgated by them, such issues must be resolved by the
courts if they amount to more than “mere procedural errors”); 1990 Term Leading
Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 398 (1991) (“When constitutional rights are
implicated . . . the balance of values clearly shifts against agency deference.”).
68. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1999).
69. See Ma, 208 F.3d at 821.
70. See id. at 822.
71. See id. at 821 n.13 (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)
(holding that courts must adhere to the  principles of Chevron deference when
addressing issues regarding an executive agency’s construction of a statute, which
that agency is charged with administering)).
72. See id. at 825 (“[O]ur case law makes clear that, as a general matter, aliens
who have entered the United States, legally or illegally, are entitled to the
protections of the Fifth Amendment.”).  See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369 (1886) (stating that aliens within the United States are protected by the
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Furthermore, because the INS’ interpretation of IIRIRA raised a
substantial constitutional question, namely whether indefinite
detention violates aliens’ due process rights, the court concluded that
traditional Chevron principles of judicial deference did not control.73
As a result, the Ninth Circuit refused to defer to the Attorney
General’s interpretation of IIRIRA, thereby becoming the first circuit
court to hold that IIRIRA does not authorize the INS’ policy of
indefinite detention.74  In so doing, the court invoked the doctrine of
constitutional narrowing,75 which allowed it to read into the statute an
implied “reasonable time limitation” for purposes of detention.76  By
way of explanation, Judge Reinhardt, writing for the majority, stated,
“[o]ur reading . . . better comports with the language of the statute
and permits us to avoid assuming that Congress intended a result as
harsh as indefinite detention in the absence of any clear statement to
that effect.”77  Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit stated in a similar case:  “if

Fourteenth Amendment); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (holding that
resident aliens are owed a measure of due process protection).
73. See Ma, 208 F.3d at 821, n.13; see also Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (citing, inter alia, various case law that has held
that when serious constitutional questions arise, the judiciary will not extend the
same level of deference to the executive agency); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94
(1980) (recognizing the need for judicial review of an agency’s decision to
involuntarily commit a patient to a mental institution and stating that when
enforcing laws which impose “conditions . . . so severe or different from ordinary
conditions of confinement” they must comply with the minimum requirements of
due process).
74. See American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Press Release, Federal Appeals
Court Says INS Must Free Indefinitely Detained Immigrants,  Apr. 10, 2000, available at
http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/n041000c.html (“‘Today’s ruling marks a victory
for fundamental fairness in America,’ said Judy Rabinovitz, Senior Staff Counsel of
the American Civil Liberties Union’s Immigrants Rights Project.”).
75. See Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1997) (defining
constitutional narrowing as when courts elect to construe statutes in such a way as to
avoid deciding difficult, serious, or grave constitutional questions).  The court noted
in Williams, that agencies can adopt any interpretation they wish, so long as that
interpretation does not infringe on constitutional rights.  See Williams, 115 F.3d at
662.  Additionally, Congress can remove any uncertainties about the meaning of a
statute by making it clear that it chose the “constitutionally doubtful interpretation,”
thereby forcing the courts “to confront the constitutional question squarely.” See id.
at 662-63.
76. See Ma, 208 F.3d at 822 (stating that such a reading was consistent with
previous statutory interpretation of similar immigration laws).  Courts have often
read limitations into statutes that appear to give broad power to immigration
officials.  See United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199 (1957) (limiting a statute
that penalized aliens for refusing to answer questions asked by an immigration
official, even though that statute did not expressly do so, because the Court reasoned
that only if aliens refused to answer questions “relevant to legitimate government
purposes” could they suffer legal consequences); Romero v. INS, 39 F.3d 977, 981
(9th Cir. 1994) (finding a rule that required aliens to answer truthfully all questions
posed by immigration officials to include an implicit applicability to only “questions
relevant to their visa status.”).
77. Ma, 208 F.3d at 822.
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Congress means to push the constitutional envelope, it must do so
explicitly.”78
2. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit, in Ho v. Greene and Nguyen v. Greene,79  faced
situations similar to that posed in Ma.  However, unlike the Ninth
Circuit, the Court in those cases concluded that INS’ indefinite
detention policy is permissible.  Like Ma, both Ho and Nguyen
entered the United States lawfully as refugees.80  Both were later
separately convicted of aggravated felonies and ordered deported by
the INS.81  Their native country, Vietnam, refused to issue travel
documents allowing for their return, and consequently the INS
placed them in detention indefinitely.82  The District Court, hearing
both cases, ordered them released, finding indefinite detention
unconstitutional.83  The Tenth Circuit reversed the decisions,
however, basing its holding on both statutory and constitutional
arguments.84
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit focused its statutory
analysis on the section of IIRIRA’s detention provision that states that
“[a]n alien . . . who has been determined by the Attorney General to
be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of
removal, may be detained beyond the removal period.”85  Unlike the
Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit did not find anything ambiguous
about the IIRIRA’s detention provisions.86  Rather than interpreting
the language as including an implicit reasonable time limit, the
Tenth Circuit interpreted the absence of a specific time limit as
explicitly granting the Attorney General the discretion to detain

78. Williams, 115 F.3d at 662 (holding that construction of a statute to prohibit
reindeer herding raised grave constitutional questions) (citing Edward I. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trade Council, 458 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)
(holding that NLRB’s interpretation of the relevant statute raised serious First
Amendment questions)).
79. 204 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2000) (The Tenth Circuit consolidated the cases of
Ho and Nguyen as they both addressed the Attorney General’s statutory authority to
indefinitely detain a removable alien).
80. See id. at 1049.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 1050 (denying Nguyen and Ho’s release because they failed to prove
that they were no longer a threat to the community or a flight risk).
83. See id. at 1052 (explaining the District Court’s holding, which did not address
the statutory argument, but instead found that “prolonged detention constituted
unconstitutional incarceration”).
84. See id. at 1060 (holding that IIRIRA authorizes indefinite detention and that
neither Ho nor Nguyen have a liberty interest deserving Due Process safeguards).
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1999).
86. See Ho, 204 F.3d at 1056 (reasoning that because the statute does not specify
any time limit on the INS’ authority to continue to detain, Congress intended to
allow for the indefinite detention of certain removable aliens).
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indefinitely certain removable aliens beyond the removal period.87
This decision, however, is contrary to a previous outcome reached
by the Tenth Circuit in a similar case.  In Rodriguez-Fernandez v.
Wilkinson,88 the Tenth Circuit refused to construe a similar detention
provision as permitting the Attorney General to detain indefinitely an
excludable alien who could not be removed expeditiously.89  The
Rodriguez-Fernandez majority concluded that the INS was authorized to
detain excludable aliens only “during proceedings to determine
eligibility to enter and, thereafter, during a reasonable period of
negotiations for their return to the country of origin or to the
transporter that brought them here.”90
The Ho court distinguished its holding from Rodriguez-Fernandez
however, reasoning that the specific section of the statute analyzed in
Rodriguez-Fernandez was ambiguous, and therefore, an imposition of a
reasonable time limit on detention was a viable interpretation in that
instance.91  In Ho, the court was unwilling to extend the same logic,
and expressly declined to “substitute its judgment for that of
Congress by reading in a time limit that is not included in the plain
language of [IIRIRA].”92  More specifically, the court concluded that
by drafting IIRIRA as it did, Congress intended to, and expressly did,
authorize the Attorney General to detain indefinitely certain
removable aliens.93
D. The Supreme Court Should Uphold the Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation
As the preceding sections demonstrate, the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits are split over how to interpret the detention provisions of
IIRIRA.  The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari and heard
arguments, hoping to resolve this disagreement within the circuits.94

87. See id. (concluding that because Congress did not include a limiting provision
in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) they must have intended to allow for the indefinite detention
of aliens).
88. 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
89. See Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1382.
90. Id. at 1389.
91. See Ho, 204 F.3d at 1056.  The statute analyzed in Rodriguez-Fernandez was
former 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1); it instructed the Attorney General to carry out an
excludable alien’s deportation at once, “unless the Attorney General, in an
individual case, in his discretion, concludes that immediate deportation is not
practical or proper.”  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) (1952).
92. Id. at 1057 (citing Pueblo of San Ildefonso v. Ridlon, 103 F.3d 936 (10th Cir.
1996) for the proposition that “[w]here statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, that language is controlling and courts should not add to that
language.”).
93. See Ho, 204 F.3d at 1056 (noting that the unambiguous language of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6) led the court to conclude that Congress intended to allow for indefinite
detention).
94. See Reno v. Kim Ho Ma, 121 S. Ct. 297 (Oct. 10, 2000) (consolidating the case
COXJCI.DOC 7/10/2001  12:16 PM
2001] INDEFINITE DETENTION 741
Because the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation does not comport with
prior Supreme Court rulings that afforded non-excludable aliens the
protections of the Constitution,95 the Supreme Court should uphold
the Ninth Circuit’s reading of the statute as outlined in Ma v. Reno,
thereby ensuring fair and consistent application of the law to aliens
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
The Supreme Court should uphold the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation because the Constitution mandates that aliens within
the United States be afforded some measure of due process.  The
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution state that no
person may be deprived of “life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.”96  Liberty from confinement is at the heart of the
liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause.97  Therefore, an
interpretation of a statute that radically eviscerates liberty rights by
permitting a governmental agency to detain aliens indefinitely,
clearly contradicts well-established Supreme Court precedent
granting aliens within U.S. borders constitutional protection.98  It is
unlikely that Congress intended IIRIRA to have this effect.
Congress likely included the statutory language, “may be detained
beyond the removal period” in recognition that the Attorney General
may occasionally need to temporarily detain removable aliens beyond
the ninety-day limit to effectuate their deportation.99  When it is
unlikely that deportation will occur in the foreseeable future,
however, the legitimacy of continued INS detention must be weighed

with Zadvydas v. Underdown, 121 S. Ct. 297 (Oct. 10, 2000)).
95. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (“Aliens, even aliens whose
presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’
guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
97. See Ho, 204 F.3d at 1062 (Brorby, J., dissenting) (“Liberty is one of those basic
rights enjoyed by all ‘persons,’ as ‘[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at
the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’”) (quoting Foucha v.
Louisana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).  Judge Brorby notes that this infringement of the
Constitution is subject to strict scrutiny, and therefore, must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest.  See id. at 1062.  In applying a strict scrutiny
test to indefinite detention, first it must be determined whether the detention at
issue is being imposed as punishment or for a legitimate regulatory purpose.  See id.
If the detention is intended as a legitimate regulation, strict scrutiny dictates that it
not be excessive in relation to the regulatory purpose Congress sought to achieve. See
id.
98. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that aliens within the
United States enjoy some measure of the protections afforded by the Constitution);
see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (same); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
(1976) (same); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (same).
99. See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that Congress made
provisions in the statute for the Attorney General to hold aliens beyond the specified
time limit in order to give her flexibility in instances where additional time could be
useful).
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in relation to the fundamental guarantees of due process.100
Therefore, the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit court split
by finding that the detention provisions of IIRIRA infer a reasonable
time limit, thus confirming that removable aliens may not be
indefinitely detained.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Supreme Court Precedent Affording Aliens Due Process Protection
The Constitution guarantees that due process protections “are
universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction [of the United States] without regard to any differences
of . . . nationality.”101  Hence, even when an alien has been convicted
of a crime that may justify his removal from the United States, he
nevertheless remains a person who cannot be deprived of his liberty
without due process of law.102
Several Supreme Court cases have upheld the principle that all
individuals within U.S. borders enjoy constitutional protection.103  In
Wong Wing v. United States,104 while the Court acknowledged the
executive agency’s power over immigration issues, it struck down a
statute authorizing the Attorney General to imprison illegal aliens for
one year before deporting them.105  The Court based its holding on

100. The INS may argue that prolonged detention of aliens previously convicted
of felonies is justified, because they pose a danger to society, however past offenses
alone do not warrant indefinite confinement.  See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
358 (1997) (holding “[a] finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not
a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment”).
101. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369.
102. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (finding that even aliens who have
entered the country illegally are protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
103. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (ruling that undocumented aliens’ children enjoy
constitutional right to education); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (holding
that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect all those within the jurisdiction
of the United States); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)
(distinguishing between aliens seeking admission to the United States and those
within our borders); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 602-03 (1953)
(holding that a resident alien seeking re-entry into the United States is entitled to the
constitutional protections afforded to a resident alien rather than an excludable
alien); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1896) (affirming that
aliens within the United States are protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
and may not be punished without a criminal trial even though ordered deported
after completion of their sentences); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368-69 (acknowledging that
all aliens within the United States are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
104. 163 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1896).
105. See id. at 237 (“When Congress sees fit to further promote such a policy by
subjecting the persons of such aliens to infamous punishment at hard labor, or by
confiscating their property, we think such legislation, to be valid, must provide for a
judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused.”).
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the idea that “even aliens shall not be held to answer for a . . . crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”106
In Plyler v. Doe,107 the Supreme Court affirmed aliens’ due process
rights, stating:
[w]hatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely
a “person” in any ordinary sense of that term.  Aliens, even aliens
whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been
recognized as “persons” guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.108
The Court also held in Shaugnessy v. United States109 that even aliens
who have entered the country illegally are entitled to due process
before being deported.110  And again, in Leng May Ma v. Barber,111 the
Court recognized that aliens within U.S. borders are entitled to rights
and privileges that those who stand at the “threshold of our borders”
do not enjoy.112  The above-cited cases  support the notion that aliens
are guaranteed certain constitutional protections that are not subject
to change with the advent of a removal order.113

106. Id. at 238.
107. 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1981).
108. Id. at 210.
109. 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
110. See id. at 212 (“Aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally,
may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of
fairness encompassed in due process of law.”).
111. 357 U.S. 185, 186 (1958) (holding “petitioner’s parole did not alter her status
as an excluded alien”).
112. See id. at 187 (“[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between
those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are
within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.”).
113. Several federal courts have also explicitly determined that removable aliens
are entitled to constitutional due process protections.  See Leader v. Blackman, 744 F.
Supp. 500, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating, “substantive due process prevents the
government from engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ or interferes with
rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”) (quoting United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)) (citation omitted).  In Leader, the court analyzed
the petitioner’s due process claim by analogizing “detention pending a deportation
hearing” to “pretrial detention,” and applied a modified strict scrutiny test from
Salerno.  See id. at 507-08 (finding “the analogy to pretrial detention appropriate, at
least for purposes of defining the proper scope of inquiry”). The Salerno test asked
(1) whether the restriction placed on the alien’s liberty is “impermissible
punishment or permissible regulation”; and (2) whether it is “excessive in relation to
the regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.  The Leader
court found that the means chosen (the provision for mandatory detention without
bail) were excessive to accomplish the government’s legitimate end (preventing
aliens from absconding pending deportation).  See Leader, 744 F. Supp. at 508
(stating that mandatory detention without bail was unconstitutional as a violation of
both procedural and substantive due process); see also Agunobi v. Thornburgh, 745 F.
Supp. 533, 536-37 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (applying the Salerno test to find that indefinitely
detaining aliens who have been convicted of aggravated felonies as a means of
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B. Fifth and Tenth Circuit’s Analysis
Despite Supreme Court precedent holding that aliens who have
entered the United States are entitled to due process protections
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,114 several circuit courts
have declared that detaining removable aliens indefinitely beyond
their original prison sentences is not unconstitutional.115  These
decisions are premised upon a legal fiction:  that even when an alien
is physically present in the country, once he has been ordered
deported, he is stripped of his constitutional rights.116  As a result, the
alien who has entered and lived in the United States for many years
essentially stands on the same footing as an excludable alien seeking
to enter the country for the first time.117

preventing them from absconding pending deportation hearings was excessive
government conduct).  The use of a strict scrutiny analysis in these cases, as opposed
to a more deferential analysis to determine the constitutionality of INS’ policy, makes
it clear that deportable aliens have protectable due process rights.  For more on the
application of strict scrutiny to cases involving indefinite detention, see Debora Ann
Gorman, Note, Indefinite Detention:  The Supreme Court’s Inaction Prolongs the Wait of
Detained Aliens, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (1994) (applying a “‘representation-
reinforcing’ theory of constitutional interpretation to examine the role played by the
federal courts in upholding the INS’ policy of indefinite detention of certain aliens
pending deportation or exclusion proceedings”).
114. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976)
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United
States.  The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment,
protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.  Even one whose presence in this
country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional
protection.
Id. (citations omitted).
115. See Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1060 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Both petitioners are
properly characterized as inadmissible aliens seeking temporary entry into the
United States.  Notwithstanding their physical presence in this country, they have no
constitutional rights regarding their application for entry.”); see also Zadvydas v.
Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 296-97 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding, similar to the court in
Ho, that indefinite detention of an alien that has been ordered removed by the
Attorney General is not a violation of the Constitution).
116. See Ho, 204 F.3d at 1058 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (Supp. II 1996); 8
C.F.R. § 1.1(p) (1999)
The term “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” means the status of
having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the
United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such
status not having changed.  Such status terminates upon entry of a final
administrative order of exclusion or deportation.
Id.
The Ho court concluded from this that even though Ho and Nguyen were
physically present in the United States, the removal orders issued against them
meant they now had the same constitutional rights, with respect to their applications
for admission, as aliens seeking to enter the country for the first time. See id. at 1060
(“Hence, the Due Process Clause does not provide petitioners a liberty interest in the
right they assert, i.e., the right to be temporarily admitted into this country.”).
117. See Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 296 (arguing both excludable and resident aliens
could come into conflict with the government’s sovereignty interests, therefore when
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For example, in Zadvydas v. Underdown,118 the Fifth Circuit found
that when a permanent resident alien becomes the subject of a final
order of deportation, that alien is no longer a permanent resident
and hence possesses the same level of constitutional protection as an
excludable alien.119  Because of the alien’s new status, the need to
expel him from a national sovereignty perspective, is identical to the
need to remove an excludable alien who has been ordered returned
to his country of origin.120
The Fifth Circuit reasoned in Zadvydas that because excludable and
removable aliens are viewed in the same light with respect to
deportation, the government has every right to treat them similarly
with respect to detention.121  Consequently, the Court found that, as
with excludable aliens, continued detention of the resident alien did
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.122  Similarly, in
Ho v. Greene,123 the Tenth Circuit found that, “[l]ike an alien seeking
initial entry, [deportable aliens] have no right to be at large in the
United States.”124  Based on this theory, the court determined that

this occurs they should both be allocated the same level of constitutional protection).
118. 185 F.3d at 283 (concerning resident alien who had been born in a displaced
persons camp in Germany and immigrated to America at the age of eight.  He
subsequently developed an extensive criminal history and was ordered deported by
the INS after spending several years in prison.  German officials however were
unwilling to accept Zadvydas.).
119. See id. at 295 n.18 (challenging the notion that previous Supreme Court
decisions have implied an “across-the-board difference” in the constitutional status of
excludable and removable aliens).
120. See id. at 296 (arguing that given the circumstances, the national interest in
deporting the petitioner was the same regardless of whether the alien was a resident
or excludable); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893)
(“The power to exclude aliens and the power to expel them rest upon one
foundation, are derived from one source, are supported by the same reasons, and are
in truth but parts of one and the same power.”).  The Zadvydas Court determined
that another compelling reason to treat the two situations similarly is that often,
when released, both resident and excludable aliens alike disappear within the
country and are difficult to locate once the government is able to effectuate
deportation. See Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 297 (explaining how “[t]hese interests are both
equally potentially present regardless of whether an aliens was once resident or
excludable”).
121. See Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 296 (arguing that just because the government has
difficulty in immediately deporting an alien, this does not necessarily recreate a
distinction in the government’s interest with regard to excludable and resident
aliens).
122. See id. at 296-97 (stating there is no Supreme Court case suggesting that
deportable aliens have some greater right to release from detention than excludable
aliens subject to the same incarceration).
123. 204 F.3d 1045, 1059-60 (10th Cir. 2000) (concerning Vietnamese refugees
who fled to America, were later convicted of aggravated felonies and subsequently
ordered removed by the INS, yet their country of origin would not accept their
return).
124. Id. (finding that although Ho had lived in the United States for many years,
the INS’ final removal orders against him stripped him of any heightened
constitutional rights he may have had before the removal orders were entered).
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there is no substantive or procedural due process impediment to
continued detention of removable aliens.125
C. Ninth Circuit’s Analysis
The court in Ma v. Reno purposely elected not to decide the
constitutionality of the INS’ indefinite detention policies, noting,
“[t]he Supreme Court has long held that courts should interpret
statutes in a manner that avoids deciding substantial constitutional
questions.”126  The Ninth Circuit, however, did point out in dicta that
the INS’ extension of exclusion law to aliens within United States
territory, who have been ordered removed, raises significant
constitutional concerns.127
Specifically the court noted that in order to adopt the INS’
approach, it would have to reconcile Supreme Court precedent
upholding removable aliens’ rights to constitutional protection, with
the INS’ suggested rule essentially stripping them of this protection.128
The court refused to take on this, “daunting, if not impossible,
task.”129
Dicta in the Ma case suggests that the Ninth Circuit disagrees with

Thus, Ho indicated that while there are distinctions between the rights of resident
aliens and the rights of excludable aliens, once ordered deported, a resident alien
stands on the same constitutional footing as an excludable alien and is not entitled
to due process protections. See id.
125. See id. at 1060 (finding no case law to support the assertion that “a deportable
alien subject to a final order of deportation and being detained by the United States
pending that deportation possess greater constitutional rights than an excludable
alien in the same position”).  When the Tenth Circuit considered the
constitutionality of indefinite detention, it accepted the Fifth Circuits view by a 2-1
vote with Justice Brorby dissenting.  In his vigorous dissent in Zadvydas, Justice Brorby
charged that indefinite detention of the petitioners may well violate the substantive
due process rights granted by the Constitution, in a matter that “shocks the
conscience.” See id. at 1060-63 (rejecting the notion that petitioners have no liberty
rights).
126. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla.
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)(construing a
statute regarding publicity in such a way so as to avoid deciding on the serious First
Amendment questions) and United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916)
(finding that the act regarding revenue measures and treaty obligations must be
construed so as not to violate the constitution)).  In invoking the notion of
“constitutional avoidance,” the Court rationalized that because it interpreted the
statute as not permitting the indefinite detention of removable aliens, it did not need
to decide the significant constitutional questions that were raised by the INS’
interpretation, authorizing indefinite detention.  See id. at 821-23 (stating that “[i]n
the immigration context, courts have often read limitations into statutes that
appeared to confer broad power on immigration officials in order to avoid
constitutional problems”).
127. See id. at 825-26 n.23 (questioning the Fifth Circuit’s construction of
§ 1231(6) and subsequent conclusions in Zadvydas).
128. See id. at 826 (noting that the court “would have to reconcile Wong Wing,
which affords constitutional protection to aliens who have been ordered deported”).
129. Id.
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the decisions of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, upholding the INS’
extension of exclusion law to aliens within United States’ territory.130
While technically there may not be a split between the circuits on this
constitutional question, there certainly is not unanimity on the issue.
Consequently, the Supreme Court should resolve the tension
between the courts in order to push Congress to enact clarifying
legislation and to ensure the law is applied equitably and consistently
to all aliens.
D. Resolving the Tension
Close analysis reveals the Fifth and Tenth Circuits employed faulty
logic in upholding the INS’ indefinite detention policies.  These
courts contend that a final removal order strips an alien of any
heightened constitutional status he may have enjoyed prior to
issuance of the removal order.  As Judge Brorby aptly stated in his
dissent in Ho, this reasoning “is supported only by a tenuous
foundation of legal fiction stacked upon legal fiction.”131
Essentially these courts have determined that removable aliens do
not possess protected liberty interests in avoiding unjustified
detention, because their removal order “converts” them into
excludable aliens.132  Having created this fiction, courts then are able
to characterize immigrants, who are physically present within U.S.
borders, as never having entered into the country.  This
characterization, in turn, strips the alien of any due process
protections he may otherwise have enjoyed.133  Consequently, while
these newly created excludable aliens previously may have enjoyed
constitutional protections against imprisonment for purposes other
than punishment for a criminal offense, their detention now is simply
characterized as an extension of exclusion proceedings and therefore
subject to the discretion of the Attorney General.134

130. See id. at 827 (demonstrating the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly hold that the
INS’ detention policy is unconstitutional, but dicta in the opinion alluded to as much
when the court pronounced, “[e]ven if we were to agree with the Fifth Circuit’s
constitutional holding—and we do not by any means suggest that we do”).  While
this dicta is not controlling, it is significant; shedding light on how the court views
this policy and how it may rule on this issue in the future.
131. Ho, 204 F.3d at 1061 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 1058 (contending it is most appropriate to view the liberty interests
at stake in these cases from the perspective of an excludable alien who has requested
entry into the United States and has been denied, and consequently is being
indefinitely detained because his country of origin will not accept him back).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 1061 (Brorby, J., dissenting) (discussing the majority’s conclusion
that detention is simply an extension of the exclusion proceedings and consequently
falls within the plenary power of the political branches to govern immigration
matters).
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Contrary to the Fifth and Tenth Circuits’ reasoning, an alien’s due
process rights are not extinguished by a final removal order against
him.  In fact, these courts’ denial of due process protections expressly
contradicts well-established Supreme Court precedent recognizing
that the Constitution’s most fundamental guarantees apply both to
citizens and non-citizens, including non-citizens who have entered
the United States illegally.135  This line of cases firmly establishes that
removable aliens are ‘persons’ protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.136
Because it is clear that removable aliens do retain their
constitutional rights,137 and because liberty from bodily restraint is a
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause,138 any
infringement of this right must be strictly scrutinized to determine
whether the policy is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.”139  Essentially, strict scrutiny demands that the government’s
interest in regulation be balanced against the likelihood that it will be
able to effectuate deportation within a reasonable time period.140
Without a doubt the government has a significant interest in
protecting the public from dangerous felons and in preventing aliens

135. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (recognizing that a
permanent resident alien returning from abroad enjoys due process rights even in an
exclusion proceeding); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903) (concluding
that even excludable aliens enjoy due process rights in deportation proceedings);
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that the Constitution
mandates that a judicial trial be held before a deportable alien can be punished by
imprisonment pending deportation).
136. See supra Part III.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s due process
jurisprudence with respect to aliens).
137. See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 824 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating, “[o]ur case law
makes clear that, as a general matter, aliens who have entered the United States,
legally or illegally, are entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment.”).
138. See Foucha v. Louisana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (recognizing that freedom
from bodily restraint is at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause).
139. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (discussing the substantive
component of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clause); see also
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (holding that if the detention is to
serve a legitimate regulatory purpose (and is not intended as punishment) then strict
scrutiny dictates that the detention cannot be “excessive in relation to the purpose
Congress sought to achieve”).
140. Similar balancing tests have been used when reviewing other types of
administrative detention.  See, e.g., United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 801 (5th Cir.
1989) (determining whether or not detention violated due process, the court
weighed the seriousness of the charges against the length of detention that had
occurred or could occur in the future); United States v. Gelfuso, 838 F.2d 358, 359
(9th Cir. 1988) (finding that whether or not pre-trial detention violates due process
depends on both the length of confinement and the extent to which the prosecution
is responsible for the delay); United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510, 1516-17 (10th
Cir. 1986) (finding that four months in detention before trial was too long, given
that defendant had not played a part in the delay, and that due process required that
he be released on bond or tried within thirty days).
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from absconding prior to deportation.141  The Due Process Clause,
however, dictates that society must accept certain risks to avoid
unjustifiable deprivations of liberty.142  As the probability of removing
the alien lessens, the government’s interest in detaining him becomes
less compelling, and consequently, the infringement of the alien’s
liberty interest becomes more severe.143
It follows therefore, that the INS can lawfully detain aliens only if it
aids in their removal.  Thus, indefinite detention is “excessive” if
removal will not occur in the foreseeable future.144  Hence, the
Supreme Court should overturn the Fifth and Tenth Circuits’
holdings allowing the INS’ indefinite detention policies because they
do not pass the strict scrutiny analysis that is required when liberty
interests are at stake.
IV. COMPLYING WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
Not only does indefinite detention of removable aliens violate the
Constitution, it also contradicts international norms and standards.145

141. See Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 296-97 (5th Cir. 1999) (accepting a
“certain risk of recidivism” among criminal citizens while refusing to be “similarly
generous” with non-citizens, and therefore concluding criminal aliens should be
deported or excluded).
142. See United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 340 (2d Cir. 1986)
(setting forth a three-prong test examining the length of pre-trial detention, the
extent of the prosecution’s responsibility for delay, and the strength of the evidence
offered on whether the defendant presents a risk of flight in considering the limits
on pre-trial detention).
143. See Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (finding that
as the likelihood of an alien’s deportation decreases, so does the government’s
interest in detention, and that prolonged detention under such circumstances may
constitute a violation of the alien’s substantive due process rights); see also Michael
Williams, Comment, Doherty v. Thornburgh—Deportable Aliens Detained and Deprived of
Their Liberty:  A Substantive Due Process Analysis, 18 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 845, 858-60
(1992) (analogizing detention pending deportation to pre-trial detention and
concluding that the same balancing tests used to determine whether pre-trial
detention has become excessive also should be used in examining detention pending
deportation).
144. See Phan, 56 F. Supp.2d at 1156 (finding the lower the probability that the
government will be able to deport an alien, the less the interest the government has
in taking measures to effectuate that deportation).
145. It is not always clear however, what the status of international law is, in
relation to U.S. domestic law.  See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900) (recognized as the first case to hold that, “international law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination”).  The Paquete Habana court qualified its holding, however, by
noting that for the purpose of adjudicating matters, where no treaty, nor controlling
executive or legislative act, nor judicial decision exists, courts must resort to the
customs and usages of “civilized nations.”  See id.  See generally  Joan Fitzpatrick &
William McKay Bennett, A Lion in the Path?  The Influence of International Law on the
Immigration Policy of the United States, 70 WASH. L. REV. 589 (1995) (providing a
general overview on the status of international law with regard to immigration
matters).  In laying out the basic conceptual framework for how international law is
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In the past the Supreme Court has sought support in international
law principles when analyzing issues surrounding Congress’ plenary
power over exclusion and deportation of aliens.146  Therefore, it is
appropriate to examine international law principles when analyzing
the justness of detention policies as applied to aliens.147
It is a fundamental principle of human rights that no one should
be arbitrarily placed in detention.148  The Universal Declaration of
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applied in the United States, Fitzpatrick and Bennett begin by noting that treaties are
regarded as the supreme law of the land.  See id. at 591 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI).  If
the treaty is self-executing, it will be enforced by the judiciary. See id.  If it is non-self-
executing, Congress must first implement the treaty by statute before it can be
enforced by the courts. See id. (citing Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,
314 (1829) (discussing a treaty ceding Louisiana to the United States, noting that,
“[a] treaty . . . does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished . . .
but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the
instrument)).  However, even when a non-self-executing treaty has not been
implemented by statute, it still expresses a national policy binding on the states. See
id. (recognizing that such a treaty is still regarded as the supreme law of the land).  It
is not always clear which branch of government has the power to lawfully terminate a
treaty and therefore extinguish the nation’s international obligation. See id.
(referencing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (discussing uncertainty as to whether the executive branch had the
power to terminate a treaty with Taiwan)).  In determining whether a treaty or a
conflicting statute is binding, U.S. case law has held that the later in time controls.
See id. at 591-92 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 628 (1889)
(considering the exclusion of a Chinese laborer under an act of Congress possibly in
violation of a treaty with the Chinese government); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190, 194 (1888) (considering the tension between an act of Congress creating a duty
on the importation of sugar and a treaty abrogating a duty as to certain nations);
Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (refusing to grant treaties superiority
over acts of Congress)).  Therefore, if Congress enacts a statute that conflicts with
the obligations of a pre-existing treaty, it is the statue that will be given domestic legal
effect. See id. at 591-92.  A commonly held rule, however, provides that “statutes
should not be interpreted as inconsistent with treaties unless no other construction is
possible.” See id. at 592 (citing Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (noting that the act suspending commercial intercourse
between the United States and France shouldn’t be construed to affect neutral
commerce if any other possible construction remains)).
146. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (“It is an
accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power . . .
to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions . . . this power belongs to
the political department of government.”).
147. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981)
(using the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on
Human Rights to support the argument that continued incarceration for
administrative reasons is arbitrary and unjust).
148. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 (1987) (providing “[a] state violates international law if, as a matter of
policy, it practices, encourages, or condones . . . prolonged, arbitrary detention”); see
also Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981)
(observing that perhaps one of the most important principles of international law is
that human beings should be free from arbitrary imprisonment); Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg.
ART. 9, at 137, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exhile.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 168, U.N. Doc. A/6316 ART.
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Human Rights149 states that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile,”150 and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights151 similarly declares that “no one shall be deprived
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedures as are established by law.”152  Detention is arbitrary when
it is haphazard, unwarranted, or not accompanied by fair procedures
for legal review.153
Additionally, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights provides that “anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in
order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his
detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.”154
Thus, even when a person has been detained in conformance with
the law, that person still is entitled to a timely and expeditious appeal
procedure.155
Everyone within U.S. jurisdiction is entitled to basic human rights
protections, including immigrants detained by the INS.156  Individuals
in INS detention, regardless of their immigration status, have the
right to be free from arbitrary detention and to be protected from
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9 PARA. 4 (1967) (“Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall
be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may decide
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the
detention is not lawful.”).
149. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
150. See id.
151. Dec. 19, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. No. 95-2, (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
152. See id. at 175.
153. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at III, Legal Standards; see also
Weisselberg, supra note 47, at 1007 (maintaining that cases in international law stand
for the proposition that non-criminal detention that is not reviewable by a competent
court is arbitrary).  When the United States confines aliens for prolonged periods
without full judicial review, this detention becomes arbitrary and violates customary
international law agreements. See id.
154. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 151, at
168.  But see Louis N. Schulze, Jr., Note, The United States’ Detention of Refugees:
Evidence of the Senate’s Flawed Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 641, 651-52 (1997)
(discussing the government’s argument that courts should not apply the covenant
because the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) was
ratified by the Senate as “non-self executing”) (citing Advice and Consent, 138 Cong.
Rec. S4781-01, 4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (declaring the treaty non-self
executing)).  Schulze concluded, however, that when the Executive became a party
to the covenant, it gave its assurance to the international community and the Senate
that United States’ domestic law would comply with the Covenant. See id. at 678. It
became apparent, however, that the executive branch’s promises were misleading
when the Senate ratified the Covenant as a non-self-executing treaty, and the courts
began to deny domestic remedies to alien refugees.  See id.  The result is that the
ratification of the Covenant as non-self-executing is invalid. See id.
155. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at III, Legal Standards.
156. See id.
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cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.157  While jails are designed
to be punitive and rehabilitative institutions, many aliens in detention
are jailed only because they cannot be deported.158  Even when the
initial detention is justified, that detention becomes arbitrary when a
detainee, who is no longer serving a criminal sentence, does not
know when he will be released and has no genuine mechanism to
challenge the indefinite nature of his detention.159
As the court noted in Ma, the Charming Betsy rule of statutory
construction160 requires that courts construe congressional legislation
in such a way that avoids violating international law.161  Courts
generally adhere to this rule “out of respect for other nations.”162

157. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 151
(“[A]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”); see also The Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Article 16(1), G.A. Res. 39/46, Dec. 10 1984 (requiring that detainees not be
subjected to any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment while in
detention); The American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, Nov. 22,
1969; The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 149.
158. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at IV, Findings (observing that when
aliens cannot be deported, generally it is because they are stateless or their
government refuses to accept them).
159. See id.  But see Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 285 n.4 (1999) (citing
Gisbert v. U.S. Attorney General, 988 F.2d 1437, 1448 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the
notion that indefinite detention is arbitrary)).  Although Gisbert ruled on the fate of
an excludable, rather than a removable alien, the Court in Zadvydas concluded that
because it was not aware of any distinctions in international law between removable
and excludable aliens, Gisbert was controlling. See Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 285 (“We are
unaware of any presently relevant distinction in international law between excludable
and resident aliens, so for the purpose of adjudicating the application of
international law Gisbert is directly controlling.”).
160. See Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-18 (1804)
(discussing the construction of the Non-intercourse Act of February 27, 1800, 2 Stat.
7, in light of customary international standards on diplomatic protection).
161. See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 829-30 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct.
297 (2000) (recognizing that “we generally construe Congressional legislation to
avoid violating international law”); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 145, at 604-05
(referencing Justice Harlan’s majority opinion in Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S.
536 (1884) for the proposition that judicial interpretation of statutes avoiding
violations of international law, rather than adoption of otherwise violative literal
meanings, is grounded in the judiciary’s “proper respect” to the executive as a
coordinate branch of government charged with immigration policymaking).
Another reason courts avoid construing legislation in a way that violates international
law is discussed in Chew Heong.  This case suggests that in the process of legislating,
when Congress fails to pay careful attention to international obligations, this implies
a lack of “intelligence and patriotism” and reflects badly not only on Congress but on
the American people as a whole.  See Fitzpatrick, supra, note 145 at 604-05.  In Chew
Heong, Justice Harlan found that the court has a responsibility, to be both activist and
deferential, and must take care to construe statutes as being consistent with
international law even if there is another plausible interpretation. See Chew Heong,
112 U.S. at 540.  Harlan finds that while courts may occasionally intrude on the
policy-making powers of immigration authorities, they must take care to remain
appropriately deferential and maintain “proper respect” for coordinate branches of
government. See id.
162. Ma, 208 F.3d at 830 (citing United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1069
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Because it is well-established that prolonged and arbitrary detention
is contrary to international law, it is appropriate to construe 8 U.S.C.
1231(A)(6) in such a way that does not authorize indefinite
detention.163
The court in Ma acknowledged that when a statute is
constitutional, and has been enacted properly, it displaces
international law, even if that statute violates international law.164
However, statutes authorizing indefinite detention of removable
aliens are inherently unconstitutional because they deny aliens their
freedom beyond the completion of the regulatory process of removal.
This denial is an evisceration of the core liberty guarantees protected
by the Due Process Clause.  Consequently, this unconstitutional
policy cannot negate international law, and the Fifth and Tenth
Circuit’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(A)(6), authorizing
indefinite imprisonment, should be superceded by the
internationally recognized prohibition against indefinite and
arbitrary detention.165

(9th Cir. 1990) (discussing the extraterritorial application of a law governing child
pornography, noting that although Congress is not bound by international law in
enacting statutes, out of respect for other nations courts should refrain from
interpreting a statute in a way that violates international law)).
163. See id. at 830 (reasoning that the indefinite detention of petitioner “might
violate international law” and that avoiding an interpretation inconsistent with
international law “renders [the statute] consistent with the Charming Betsy rule”).  For
more on the international community’s attempt to promote human rights in
domestic law, see the U.N. CHARTER.  This treaty was ratified by the United States,
and specifically called upon the United Nations to promote the protection of human
rights and for member nations to take “joint and separate action to achieve that
goal.”
164. Ma, 208 F.3d at 830 n.28 (citing Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d 956, 963
(9th Cir. 1991) (observing that when domestic and international laws conflict, a
properly enacted domestic law will displace the international law provided the
domestic law is constitutional); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §
115(1)(a).  The Restatement provides,
An act of Congress supercedes an earlier rule of international law or a
provision of an international agreement as law of the United States if the
purpose of the act to supercede the earlier rule or provision is clear and if
the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled.
Id.
Aside from the constitutional question, the court in Ma was reasonable in assuming
that while Congress could enact a statute that overrides international law, it is
unlikely that they would when, the statute and the international law can be
reasonably reconciled.  See Ma, 208 F.3d at 830.
165. See Lance Pace, Barrera-Echavarra v. Rison:  The Court Once Again Sees the Fiction
and Ignores the Truth, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 533, 550-51 (1997) (discussing the
application of international law in the Barrera-Echavarra case, and concluding that
international law prohibiting arbitrary detention trumps domestic laws authorizing
indefinite detention, because these domestic laws are “abhorrent to our
constitution”); see also Weisselberg, supra note 47, at 1009 (discussing how human
rights norms provide a way to measure our own nation’s conduct and determine
whether we meet the baseline standards required of all nations).  Weisselberg notes
that our immigration practices would better conform with human rights norms if all
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Many INS detainees are held indefinitely by the INS because they
are stateless or are nationals of a country with limited or no
diplomatic relations with the United States.166  Their liberty often has
been subject to the Attorney General’s seemingly limitless
discretion.167  The circuit courts are split on the amount of deference
due to Congress and the Attorney General, and how heavily to weigh
the rights of the alien in question.168
This split has resulted in removable aliens being afforded different
levels of due process depending on where they are detained pending
deportation.  To resolve this dilemma and to bring U.S. policy in line
with international norms and standards, Congress should pass
legislation requiring the INS to create federal regulations establishing
reasonable time limits on detention for immigrants whose
deportation cannot be secured once it is final.
In addition, to ensure that aliens are treated fairly and consistently
in the deportation process, the Supreme Court should confirm that
removable aliens within the United States are entitled to
constitutional due process protections and may not be arbitrarily
detained.
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people, within U.S. territory, standing at the border or detained abroad by our
government, were considered persons within the Due Process Clause and were
provided with fair judicial proceedings.  See id.  But see Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism,
International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361,
1363 (1999) (arguing that while international human rights norms are relevant to
some key immigration issues, they cannot provide answers to questions where
“distinctively American notions of community and immigration” are at play).
Motomura finds that the international human rights perspective focuses on
safeguarding non-citizens’ interests and rights, but fails to analyze how their interests
and rights are intertwined with the interests of citizens.  See id.
166. See supra Part II.A.
167. See Gorman, supra note 113 (commenting on the statutory history of the
indefinite detention of deportable aliens).
168. See supra Parts II and III.
